Background

Question #1: When an individual presents what the federal courts have repeatedly found is "inviolable" and "persuasive" proof of their actual, factual innocence, see, e.g., Helton v. Singletary , 85 F.Supp.2d 1323, 1332-33 (S.D.Fla. 1999) (granting my federal petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after finding - on the merits -that my "inexperienced" assistant public defender, Gerod Hooper, was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present jurors with "inviolable" proof of my innocence) - exculpatory gastric contents evidence - showing that I was not at the scene at the time of the incident), aff'd sub nom. Helton v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections, 233 F.3d. 1322, 1327 (11^th Cir. 2000) (unanimously affirming the grant of my federal habeas corpuson the merits- that Mr. Hooper was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present jurors with "persuasive" proof of my innocence), should that person remain unlawfully incarcerated - or even be executed - for a crime they did not commit in violation of the Constitution merely because their attorney failed to comply with a purely procedural technicality under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "AEDPA"), Pub.L. No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996), see e.g. Helton v Secretary for the Depatrtment of Corrections, 259 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11^thCir. 2001 ("Because [my federal habeas corpus  petition is procedurally barred by the AEDPA's one year statue of limitation [(codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2244 d))], the federal courts now believe that they need not consider whether [my "inexperienced" assist public defender] was ineffective [for failing to adequately investigate and present jurors with that 'inviolable' and 'persausive'  proof of my innocence]"); and Steve Marshall, On Deadline: What others are reporting, Late legal filings matter of life and death, USA Today, March 13, 2009, at 3A (pointing out, inter alia, that the Houston Chronicle "said defense lawyers failed to meet federally mandated filing deadlines [under the AEDPA] for six inmates who were subsequently executed and that three [other] inmates [completely] lost their federal appeals [under § 2254] because of the botched [habeas corpus] filings [outside the deadlines provided by the AEDPA  in  § 2244(d)]")?

Question #2: When an individuals attorney fails to timely file his client's federal habeas corpus petition in accordance with the one year statue of limitation provided by the AEDPA in § 2244(d), thereby resulting in a valid claim that the attorney's client was convicted or sentenced in violation of of the Constitution being barred by a purely procedural technicality, see, e.g. Helton
259 F.3d at 1315 (reversing the grant of my federal habeas corpus with a meritorious claim that my "inexperienced" assistant public defender was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present jurors with "inviolable" and "persuasive" proof of my actual, factual innocence just because Mr. Black failed to ensure a timely filing under § 2244(d)), do "the more flexible standards of due process announced in the Fifth Amendment" entitle that person "to a hearing on a claim that they missed the deadline to file a [federal habeas corpus petition] because their attorney [either] had agreed [as privately retained or pro bona counsel or was court appointed] to file the [petition] but failed to do so in a timely manner," and, "if the [individual) prevails at the hearing, then the individual is authorized to belatedly file a [federal habeas corpus petition] challenging their conviction or sentence." see, e.g., Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931,934 [4-6] (Fla. 1999)?

Question #3: Because any order procured by fraud on a Florida court, including an order denying a Florida prisoner's motion for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, may be set aside "at any time," see, e.g., Booker v. State, 503 So.2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1987), and because due process requires that he or she be given "every opportunity". to (1) expose the alleged fraud, and (2) obtain meaningful relief from the order denying his or her Rule 3.850 motion, see e.g., State v. Glover, 564 So.2d 191, 192-93 [2] (Fla. 5^th DCA 1990), would state habeas corpus relief be warranted to correct a manifest injustice directly resulting from the argument and factual misrepresentations which the prosecution fraudulently made to the Florida courts in order to persuade and convince them to summarily reject a valid claim asserted in a Rule 3.850 motion that a Florida prisoner was convicted or sentence in violation of the Constitution - especially when the fraud was later exposed in the federal courts, see, e,g., Baker v State, 878 So.2d 1236, 1246 (Fla. 2004) (Anstead, C.J., specially concurring) ( making it clear that the writ of habeas corpus "is enshrined in our Constitution to be used as a means to correct manifest injustices and its availability for use when all  other remedies have been exhausted has served our society well over many centuries and that the Florida Supreme Court "will, of course, remain alert for claims of manifest injustice, as will all Florida courts")?


While I was able to uncover and present what the federal courts have repeatedly found to be "inviolable" and "persuasive" proof of my actual, factual innocence, see, e.g., Helton v. Singletary, 85 F.Supp.2d 1323, 1332-33 (S.D.Fla 1999)(Helton IV) (granting my federal petition for writ of habeas corpusunder 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after finding - on the merits- that my "inexperienced" assistant public defender, Gerod Hooper, was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present juriors with "invioable proof of my innocence - exculpatory gastric contents evidence - showing that I was not at the scene on Little Torch Key, Florida when the son, Marshall Gunderson, of my ex- fiancee, Marcella Gunderson died on July 31, 1991, aff'd sub nom. Helton v. Sec'y for Dept of Corrs., 233 F.3d 1322, 1327 (11^thCir. 2000) (Helton V) (unanimously affirming Helton IV after similarly finding - on the merits - that Mr. Hooper was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present jurors with that "persuasive" proof of my innonce); see also Helton v. State, 18 Fla.L.Weekly D1215,D1215-16 (Fla. 3^rd DCA May 11, 1993) (Helton 1) (unanimously reversing my first degree murder conviction - with directions to discharge me - after finding that the purely circumstantial evidence adduced at trial did not preclude the reasonable possibility that Ms. Gunderson committed the crime "hours earlier" than alleged by the prosecution), reh'g granted,641 So.2d 146, 154-56 (Fla. 3^rdDCA 1994) (Nesbit, J., dissenting) (Helton II)(expressing a dissenting opinion that I am at least entitled to a new trial because Mr. Hooper was per se ineffective for failing to use the exculpatory gastric contents evidence to show jurors that Marshall's death occurred shortly after he ate his "light" dinner of chicken, rice and strawberry yogurt at 6:30 p.m. - and well before I arrived at home at 9:30 p.m.  However, I continue to remain unlawfully incarceraqted for a crime I did not commit just because my privately retained attorney, Mel Black, failed to timely file my federal habeas corpus in accordance with Antiterrorist ad Effective Death Penality Act of 1996.